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High-Tech Lending: Maintaining 
Priority in an Intangible World 
R. Marc Mercier* and Richard A. Haigh** 
Financing intangible intellectual property in Canada presents some novel demands on 
lenders because oft he interaction of provincial security schemes withfederal intellectual 
property legislation. This article looks at the relative ease with which security interests 
in intangible property may be obtained under provincial personal property security 
regimes, and then at the various federal intellectual property statutes. which exhibit 
more (~la piecemeal approach to financing. In addition, a number (~l constitutional 
issues arise because of this jurisdictional split, and the article e.tplores these issues, 
comparing the situation in Canada with that in the United States. The article suggests 
that unless legislatire reform occurs, a cautious and pragmatic approach to securing 
intangible assets in Canada is warranted. 
lejlnancement de la propriere intel!ectuelle au Canada pose des problemesparticuliers 
aux preteurs en raison de !'interaction entre !es legislations federate et provinciales. 
l 'article souligne la relative facilite avec laquelle ii est possible decreer une st'irete sur 
!es biens incorporels en vertu des lois provinciales, a/ors qu 'au niveau federal, la 
disparite des lois regissant la propriete intellectuelle commande des approches distinc-
tes. Plusieurs questions de droit constitutionnel se sou/event; !'article /es explore et 
et ab lit une comparaison avec la situation prevalant aux Etats-Unis. Tant qu 'une reforme 
legislative ne prendra pas place, une attitude prudente et pragmatique s'impose pour 
ce qui regarde la creation de st'iretes dans ce domaine au Canada. 
Partner, Fraser Milner, Toronto. 
Lecturer/Research Fellow, Deakin University, Melbourne. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The world of today is far different than the world of the mid-nineteenth 
century. Personal computers, laser printers. facsimile machines. men walking on 
the moon, were then unheard of. Today. the words of Francis Thompson, althc~ugh 
written in another context are apt: 
0 world inl'isib/e we view 1hee. 
0 H'or!d intangible we touch lhee, 
0 world unknowable. we know thee, 
lnapprehensible, WP l'l111ch thee. 
Although some may view my decision on this point as extreme temerity, l 
am nevertheless convinced that the growth of the common law should not be 
impeded by the dead hand of a mid-nineteenth century judge.' 
Canada's economy, like that of most industrialized nations, is be-
coming more and more one based on information. The research, devel-
opment and ultimate sale of intellectual property are now significant 
aspects of trade and business around the globe. High-technology2 com-
panies operating in Canada, particularly those in the telecommunica-
tions, computer and biotechnology industries, will necessarily play a 
strong role in the Canadian economy for many years to come. Unfor-
tunately, most of these companies have few tangible assets on which to 
rely for financing, making traditional lenders uneasy. As a result, ade-
quate collateralization of intellectual and other "intangible" forms of 
property is now a pressing issue for creditors. 
The underlying theme of this aiticle is that lenders should not be 
reluctant to provide financing to Canadian high-technology companies. 
While institutional lending in this environment is not simple, solutions 
- some more creative than others - do exist. Even though many of 
the informational and intellectual assets of businesses in this age are 
intangible, legal and financial structures are available that allow le!lders 
to obtain the security they require. 
This article addresses some of the more significant issues that face 
Canadian lenders in taking security over the assets of high-technology 
Carter D.C.J .. Planet Earlh Productions Inc. v. Rowlands ( 1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 
715 (Ont. H.C.), at 726 ("Planet Earth"). 
To provide a meaningful definition of ''high technology" is not a simple task. It is 
probably a term of art that defies concise definition. For the purposes of this article, 
all references to ''high technology" will be roughly equated with intensive research, 
development and ultimate sale of new and innovative products. processes and tech-
nologies. For an expanded but nevertheless incomplete definition, see D. W. Lentz 
"Financing High-Technology: Congress Invests ir: a Retter Idea" ( 1982), 9 Rutgers 
Comp. & Tech. L.J. 209, at n. I. 
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finns, by providing a legal and practical overview of the principal means 
for obtaining security interests in intellectual and other "intangible" 
forms of prope11y. The article is broken down into five parts. The first 
part provides an overview of various forms of intellectual property. The 
second part examines how lenders can perfect security interests in and 
achieve priority over intellectual and intangible prope11y under personal 
property security legislation.3 The third and fourth parts look at the 
federal intellectual property legislation and the jurisdictional impact that 
that legislation has on the taking of security in intellectual property. The 
article concludes by reiterating the need for caution and due diligence, 
and outlining suggested areas for legislative reform. Due to space limi-
tations, the a11icle will not address the enforcement of security interests 
or issues of priority, other than in the constitutional context. 
2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER PROPERTY 
INTERESTS 
(a) Introduction 
One of the most basic of secured lending principles is that lenders 
should know and understand their borrowers. An integral part of any 
such analysis requires lenders to determine, with great precision, what 
assets a boJTower has and will be required to furnish as security. Most 
of the assets owned by high-technology companies are inherently intan-
gible and, as such, cannot be classified as readily as more traditional 
tangible assets. Nevertheless, each of the key types of property in this 
area may be the proper subject-matter of a security interest. 
The most common forms of intellectual property include patents, 
copyrights, trade-marks and industrial designs, each of which will be 
Eight Canadian provinces and one tcITitory have each enacted personal property 
security legislation: Alberta: S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05; British Columbia: R.S.B.C. 1996, 
c. 359; Manitoba: R.S.M. 1987. c. P-35; New Brunswick: S.N.B. 1993, c. P-7.1; 
Nova Scotia: S.N.S. 1995-96. c. J 3; Ontario: R.S.O. 1990, c. P. I 0; Prince Edward 
Island: S.P.E.I. J 997. c. 3: Saskatchewan: S.S. 1993. c. P-6.2; and Yukon Territory: 
R.S. Y. 1986, c. 130. Notwithstanding that the rules governing movable hypothecs 
contained in the Civil Code of Quebec. S.Q. 1991, c. 64, reflect traditional civil law 
conceptual structure and legal style in the private law context. much of the substance 
will be familiar to lawyers practising in personal property security jurisdictions. The 
Civil Code of Quebec brings Quebec more in line with other systems in North 
America. The Northwest Territories and Newfoundland are expected to implement 
similar regimes in due course. Unless otherwise noted, all references in this article 
arc to the Ontario Personal Property Security Act ( · 'PPSA' '). 
48 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [14 B.F.L.R.] 
dealt with separately below.4 Canada now also has specific legislation 
dealing with integrated circuits, which are a special form of intellectual 
property.5 However, other assets also play a vital role in high-technology 
industries, such as contractual rights and licences of hi(rh-technology 
"' ~ 
products like computer applications. All are equally capable of being 
collateralized. The following is a brief review of some of the more 
significant of these assets. In later parts, we extend the analysis to 
examine how various forms of security differ depending on the type of 
asset. 
(b) Patents 
Patents protect the essential technical elements of high technology, 
such as computer algorithms and organizational structures incorporating 
new ideas and new processes. The Patent Act protects those who have 
made significant investments of time and money in developing an in-
vention from the activities of others who may simply copy the patented 
subject-matter without expending any of the costs associated with the 
required research and development. The protection only accrues on the 
registration of a patent. Before a patent may be issued in relation to a 
pa1ticular invention, it must meet the requirements of eligibility defined 
in the Patent Act.7 The tests of novelty, utility, non-obviousness and 
Although not forming part of this article, it is important to note that other forms of 
property arc often included within the rubric of intellectual property and that these 
forms may hold significant value for lenders. For example. Parliament has enacted 
the Plam Breeders· Rights Act. S.C. l 990, c. 20 to protect the proprietary interests 
of breeders of new plant varieties. Likewise, trade secrets and other confidential 
information often find their way into intellectual property discussions. which are 
governed hy common law principks rather than by statute. Trade secrcls consist 
largely of information (hut also formulas, patterns and devices) used by a business 
in such a way that it gains advantage over competitors who do not know or do not 
use it: Rimes v. Club Cmp. r~f America, 542 S.W. (2d) 909 (Tex. Civ. App.), at 9 I 3. 
Lenders should be aware that there may be exigible proprietary value in such con-
fidential informalion. even though the Supreme Court of Canada has expressed doubt 
whether this might be the case: see R. v. Stewart. [I 988] I S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. 
(4th) I. S1ewar1 was decided in a criminal context, however. and it is probable that 
trade secrets in the civil context are sufficiently proprietary so as to constitute personal 
property. 
Sec sec. 2(1), '"Integrated Circuits". inji·a. 
" R.S.C. l 985, c. P-4 ("Patent Act"). Canada first enacted the Patent Act in 1869 
(S.C. 1869, c. 11 ). 
7 Ibid., s. 27( I). 
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inventiveness must be satisfied in order for a particular "invention" to 
be patentable.8 The Patent Act grants to successful applicants "the ex-
clusive privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the in-
vention and selling it to others to be used. " 9 
Patents are a monopoly right created by statute; there is no common 
law right to patent protection. 10 The monopoly gives owners broad rights 
that can be very lucrative. Owners may choose to exploit a patent grant 
directly by selling the patented good to the public on an ongoing basis, 
or indirectly by agreeing to assign or license a third party to use the 
patent. Either way, the owner of the patent may derive significant income 
from use of the patent. The amount of income is related to the period of 
exclusivity granted under the legislative monopoly - clearly, the in-
herent worth of the product and the exclusivity period determine the 
value of a patent as security. 
(c) Copyright 
The Copyright Ad 1 protects works of authorship, whether literary 
or artistic, that are affixed to or set out on a particular medium. Copyright 
protection is not afforded to ideas, but is given to ideas that ultimately 
are expressed physically. In this way, copyright controls the proliferation 
and reproduction of ideas in a tangible form. Physical manifestation of 
a copyrighted work may be expressed on paper (for example, in lyrics 
for music and screen plays) and, most important in the high-technology 
environment, in computer programs. 12 Copyright gives to the owner the 
An "invention" is defined in the Patent Act at s. 2 as ''any new and useful art, 
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter" or any new and useful 
improvement in relation to any of these. 
'' Ibid., s. 42. Patents granted pursuant to an application filed after 30 September l 989 
enjoy exclusive protection under the legislation for a period of 20 years from the 
date of filing, as Jong as yearly maintenance fees arc paid. A patent will lapse if the 
holders fail to keep maintenance fees current. Patents filed prior to I October 1989, 
have an exclusive protection period of 17 years from the date the patent was granted. 
See ss. 44-45 of the Patent Act. 
w 22050 Farbwerke Hoeschst AG Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents). [ 1964) S.C.R. 49 at 57, 25 Fox Pat. C. 99, 41 C.P.R. 9. 
11 R.S.C. l 985, c. C-42 ("Copyright Act"). 
12 A computer program is generally a planned set of instrnctions that operate the 
machinery of a computer or computer system. The Copyright Act has been revised 
so as to provide a precise definition for "computer program'' -s. 2 defines computer 
program as' 'a set of instructions or statements, expressed, fixed, embodied or stored 
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exclusive right to reproduce, distribute or otherwise display these works 
and works substantially derived from them. i:i This right extends to com-
puter programs and the publication of materials, such as user manuals 
and guides, that instruct users on how to use ce1tain applications and 
technologies. 14 Most copyright subsists for the life of the author plus 50 
years. 15 
Statutory protection given under the Copyright Act is automatically 
granted to every original work provided that the author meets the qual-
ifications set out in the legislation. 16 In contrast with patents, there is no 
necessity for registration under the Copyright Act; however, it is strongly 
recommended, since such registration serves as evidence of the existence 
of the copyrighted work and allows an owner to enjoy significant prac-
tical and tactical benefits. 17 
in any manner, that is to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring 
about a specific result". 
,., Section 54 of the Copyright Act establishes a register of copyrights in which ''names 
and addresses of authors, and such other pa11iculars as may be prescribed" may be 
entered. Any one of the author, publisher, owner or ·'other person interested" may 
cause particulars to be entered in the register. 
J.j The time, effort and financial resources required to create a computer program are 
significant. In an early computer copyright infringement case, Apple Computer. Inc. 
claimed that it took 146 person-months to create 14 related programs at a cost of 
more than $740,000 (U.S.), excluding the costs associated with creating oracquiring 
earlier versions of the programs: Apple Computer Inc. r. Franklin Computer Corp. 
( 1985), 7 I 4 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), at 1245. 
" Copyright Act, s. 6. 
'" Section 5( I) of the Copyright Act affords protection to the nationals of all Berne 
Convention signatory nations. Both Canada and the United States arc signatories. 
17 In particular, pursuant to s. 39 of the Copyright Act. the registration of a copyright 
prior to infringement will permit a plaintiff to seek remedies beyond mere injunctive 
relief, which is the only remedy available to a plaintiff who has not registered. 
Section 39 provides as follows: 
Where proceedings are taken in respect of the infringement of the copyright 
in any work and the defendant in his defence alleges that he was not aware of 
the existence of the copyright in the work, the plaintiff is not entitled to any 
remedy other than an injunction in respect of rhe infringement if the defendant 
proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware and had no reasonable 
ground for suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work. but (fat the date of 
iiifringement the copyright in the work was duly registered under this Act, the 
defendalll shall be deemed to have had reasonable ground for suspecting that 
copyright subsisted in the work. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Registration of copyright prior to an infringement thus clears the way for monetary 
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In 1988, Parliament amended a number of the federal intellectual 
prope1ty statutes to account for technological changes. 18 One of the most 
significant revisions resulted in specific inclusion of "computer pro-
grams" within the scope of Canada's copyright protection laws. 19 The 
Copyright Act now extends copyright protection to computer programs 
by deeming them to be "literary works" .20 The term "computer pro-
gram" in the Copyright Act includes computer programs stored in the 
form of high-level source code (programming languages readable by 
humans, such as FORTRAN, BASIC, Pascal, COBAL, or C), as well as 
those programs converted and stored as object code (machine language 
readable by computers as binary impulses of electricity).21 
As a "literary work" capable of copyright, a computer program 
must satisfy all the statutory requirements of copyright, including orig-
inality. Once these requirements are met, an author can enforce his or 
her copyright over a computer program in the same manner as any other 
copyrighted work. 
( d) Trade-marks 
Trade-marks are words, names, logos, symbols or other structures, 
used to identify, distinguish or associate, by recognition and through 
use, goods or services or their quality, with or from those of other 
parties.22 The owner of a registered trade-mark under the Trade-marks 
Act has the exclusive right to use that mark in association with a defined 
damages, delivery up of the infringing work and injunctive relief. Even though the 
Copyright Act does not expressly deem' 'marking'' a work with the copyright symbol 
as equivalent to registration, one Canadian small claims court case, albeit oflimited 
precedential weight, has implicitly stated it to be so: see Fletcher v. Polka Dot 
Fabrics Ltd. (1993), 51 C.P.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). 
rn See S.C. 1988, c. 15. All references to '"the federal intellectual property legislation'' 
or "federal intellectual property statutes" in this at1icle will, where the context 
permits, collectively refer to the Patent Act, the Copyright Act, the Trade-marks Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 ("Trade-marks Act"), the Industrial Design Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. I-9 ("IDA") and the Integrated Circuit Topography Act, S.C. 1990, c. 37 
("ICTA"). 
'" Copyright Act, s. 2. 
20 Ibid., s. 2. The definition of "literary work" includes "tables, computer programs, 
and compilations of literary works''. 
21 Ibid., s. 2. 
" Trade-marks Act, ss. 2( I), 19. 
52 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [ 14 B.F.L.R.J 
class of goods or services.2.i Typically, trade-mark registrations are made 
for 15-year periods, with 15-year renewals on payment of a renewal 
fee. 2-1 
A trade-mark consists of both the name or loao and the underlyina b b 
goodwill of the business that resides in the mark. 25 Although difficult to 
quantify precisely, this goodwill exists in and is measured by every 
customer that associates a particular name or logo with a particular 
quality or type of product. The level of goodwill increases by an owner's 
maintenance and "nurturing" of trade names or logos, which in turn 
maximize consumer recognition of the trade-mark. 
A trade-mark is founded in and maintained by use. 26 The party that 
first uses the mark in association with particular goods or services is the 
party entitled to register the mark in association with those goods or 
services.27 In addition, a mark may attain value in Canada without such 
prior use if the mark was made known in Canada or if it is a registered 
and used trade-mark in a Paris Convention country. 28 
Both existing and proposed or intended trade-marks may be reg-
istered at the Trade-marks Branch of the Canadian Intellectual Prope11y 
Office in Hull, Quebec upon application. A notice registration puts the 
public on notice of the use of a particular mark in association with the 
2 ~ lbidn s. I 9. 
'" Ibid .. s. 46( I). It is important to note that upon failure to pay the renewal fee. the 
trade-mark will be expunged from the register within a six-month period. pursuant 
to s. 46(3). 
2
"' For exarnple~ son1e or the essential assets of Coca-Cola Ltd./Ltee. arc its trade-n1arks 
which include "Coca-Cola ... "Coke". ·'Coca-Cola Classic". "Coke Classic•·, 
'·coca-Cola Classique." "Coke Classique". and the stylized "C." Without these 
universally recognizable trade-marks within the corporate asset pool, it is difficult 
to envisage how Coca-Cola Ltd./Ltee. would be much different from other "no-
name" soft drink makers. 
26 Trade-marks Act, s. 16( I )(a). 
27 Such use is effected by commercial sale of the goods or services in the ordinary 
course of trade and an accompanying association of the mark with those goods or 
services by placing the trade-mark visibly on the wares. 
"" Trade-marks Act, ss. 5(b), 16(2). While the foreign registration must be in a Paris 
Convention '·country of origin," use of the trade-mark in any country is acceptable. 
Both Canada and the United States are signatories to the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property - there are currently 127 other signatories to the 
Paris Convention. 
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particular goods or services of a registrant. A proposed or intended use 
registration can be opposed by any party who can prove prior use of the 
trade-mark in association with the stated goods or services. A trade-
mark will not become registered under the Trade-marks Act until the 
applicant has filed a declaration of use confirming that the trade-mark 
has been used in Canada. 
(e) Industrial Designs 
The Industrial Design Act affords protection to those who create 
"designs" by permitting registration of designs that are applied in an 
industrial or manufacturing setting. In order for a design to be registered 
under the IDA, it should include ''features of shape, configuration, 
pattern or ornament and any combination of those features that, in a 
finished article, appeal to and are judged solely by the eye."29 Courts 
have held that the design must be both appealing to the eye, and visually 
separate from the object to which it is applied. 30 Only the "proprietor" 
of the design is entitled to register it." The author of any design is 
considered to be its proprietor unless the author executed the design for 
another person, in which case the other person is considered to be the 
design proprietor. 
No protection is afforded to "features applied to a useful a11icle 
that are dictated solely by utilitarian function of the article" or to "any 
method or principle of manufacture or construction'' .'2 ''Useful article'' 
is defined as ''an article that has a utilitarian function and includes a 
model of any such article" and "utilitarian function" means "a function 
other than merely serving as a substrate or carrier for artistic or literary 
matter'' .33 
As a result of the imprecise and ambiguous language found in the 
IDA, it is possible to have designs registered under the IDA as well as 
under trade-mark, patent and copyright legislation. If a design is regis-
2
'> IDA, s. 2. 
1° Clatworthy & Son Ltd. v. Dale Display Fixtures Ltd., [ 1928] Ex. C.R. 159 (Can. Ex. 
Ct.), at 162; affd [1929] S.C.R. 429. 
31 IDA, s. 4. 
32 Ibid.. s. 5.1. 
31 Ibid., s. 2. 
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tered within one year from the date it is first published in Canada, 
exclusive right of use of the design for a maximum of 10 years will be 
granted to the successful applicant. 34 
(f) Integrated Circuits 
In response to international pressure to specifically protect micro-
chip technology ratherthan relying on traditional copyright laws, Canada 
enacted the Integrated Circuit Topography Act in June, 1990. This 
legislation aims at protecting the original design of an integrated circuit 
topography, whether it has been embodied in an integrated circuit prod-
uct or not, and whether the integrated circuit product is in a final or an 
intermediate form. 15 An "integrated circuit" is simply a microchip, and 
the design of the interconnections of the circuits on the microchip is the 
"topography". It is the topographical design that is protected under the 
ICTA, by allowing for the topography of an integrated circuit to be 
registered. To be in registrable form, a topography must be original.36 
The ICT A protects registered topographies for a period of up to 10 
years.-17 
Integrated circuit topographies are not capable of copyright protec-
tion under the Copyright Act as works, and have been expressly carved 
out of the legislation.38 Instead, exclusive rights to integrated circuits 
can only be obtained by registration under the ICT A. However, section 
64.2(2) of the Copyright Act clarifies the interplay between the ICTA 
and the Copyright Act by providing that, although topographies are not 
copyrightable per se, copyright protection does extend to computer 
programs and other works that are embodied in an integrated circuit 
'" Ibid .. SS. 10(1), 14(1). 
'-' ICTA, s. 2. 
36 The term "original" is defined in the ICTA at s. 4(2) as being conditional upon the 
following: 
(a) it has not been produced by the mere reproduction of another topography or of any 
substantial pai1 thereof: and 
(h) it is the result of an intellectual effon and is not. at the time of its creation. wmmonplace 
among creators of topographies or manufacturers of integrated circuit products. 
37 Ibid .• s. 5. 
" Copyright Act, s. 64.2(1) states: ''This Act does not apply. and shall be deemed 
never to have applied, to any topography or to any design. however expressed. that 
is intended to generate all or part of a topography." 
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product. Since Canada is not a leader in integrated circuit technology, 
there has been very little use of the ICTA. 
(g) Licences 
A licence allows a licensor to retain ownership of an intellectual 
property right while permitting the licensee to use the licensed property 
for a fee without infringing the licensor's ownership interest. Licences 
can divide up the intellectual property rights of the owner in a number 
of ways: 
( 1) by the nature or extent of activity that can be undertaken 
by the licensee; 
(2) by the geographical extent of the rights; or 
(3) by the time frame involved. 
Licences can be either exclusive or non-exclusive. Licensing of 
intellectual property rights is now commonplace, especially with soft-
ware developers, where the most practicable way to realize profits is to 
license products to third parties. All forms of licences are capable of 
producing an income stream that can be collateralized as security for 
lenders. 39 
(h) Other Proprietary Interests of Value 
When a bmTower begins to market its intellectual property to the 
buying public and enters into sales contracts, valuable rights (largely 
contractual and intangible in nature) may also be generated. In much the 
same way as the ultimate sale of inventory by a traditional supplier has 
the effect of transforming collateral goods into cash and accounts re-
ceivable, the marketing and sale of intellectual and intangible property, 
3
'
1 Although all of the federal intellectual property statutes provide for the taking of 
partial grants or licences in intellectual property, there is some confusion as to 
whether security interests in those licences can be taken and whether in fact they 
should be registered. Clearly, while the issue oflicensing is expressly contemplated 
under the federal regimes, the issue of taking a security interest in or over such 
licences is not. For example, see ss. 66 and 67 of the Patent Act, s. 7(2) of the JCT A, 
ss. 13(2) and (3) of the IDA. ss. 15 to 26 of the Copyright Act and s. 50( I) of the 
Trade-marks Act. This issue will be discussed further in sec. 4, ··Federal Intellectual 
Property Legislation''. 
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including any servicing contracts related to such sales, has the same 
transformative effect. However, unlike tangible goods that are sold from 
inventory, when intellectual and other intangible property products are 
sold, many of the property rights found in the underlying asset are 
retained. These can include the underlying trade-mark and copyright 
components of the asset and any licensing arrangements that may be 
entered into by the owner with third parties._ These contractual rights 
may be of significant value and can, if properly charged, represent 
substantial collateral to lenders. 
(i) Summary 
All of the above are common forms of intellectual property assets. 
To see how these may interact in practice, consider the example of a 
computer company that has developed a marketable program. Some of 
the different types of prope1ty that may be embodied within or aenerated 
b 
from this particular intellectual property asset include the following:4o 
( 1) Copyrights 
• right to reproduce copies of the program 
• right to develop works based on the program 
(2) Trade-marks 
• right to use and to license others to use the program's 
name (and any other registered logo or design related to 
it) 
(3) Industrial Designs 
• right to use the confidential design of the program 
• rights in the confidential process that developed the pro-
gram 
( 4) Integrated Circuits 
• right to use and to license others to use reaistered topoa-
o b 
raphies 
40 The example provided is an adaptation of an example by R. Nimmer and P. 
Krauthaus: see "Secured Financing and Information Prope11y Rights" ( 1988), 2 
High Tech. L. J. 195, at 202-203. 
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(5) Tangible Property 
• current and all future inventories of all copies of and 
manuals for the program 
• future inventory of subsequent versions of the program 
• all equipment (computer and otherwise) used in the cre-
ation of the program 
(6) Intangible Property 
• licence contracts with distributors of the program 
• service contracts with end-users of the program 
• royalty payments generated from all sources arising out 
of royalty arrangements for a fixed rate fee or pursuant 
to a royalty structure 
• contracts with the publisher of the program manuals 
• contracts with distributors of the program 
• licence contracts on subsequent versions of the program 
• cash and accounts receivable generated from all sales of 
the program 
• client and marketing lists 
• trade secrets 
Once a lender has properly identified all the intellectual and intan-
gible assets that a borrower has available for security purposes, the next 
step is to ensure that proper security can be taken over such property. 
The next part of this article explores the methods of taking security under 
provincial PPSAs, with a focus on Ontario. The parts that follow discuss 
federal statutes that operate on intellectual property assets and that may 
also provide scope for collateralization. 
3. TAKING SECURITY UNDER THE PPSA 
(a) Statutory Considerations: Issues and Procedures 
(i) Scope of the PPSA 
The PPSA applies to all consensual transactions between parties 
that create in substance a security interest in personal property, without 
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regard to title or form. 41 In the high-technology financing context, two 
key concerns arise: 
(1) the scope of "personal property" covered by the PPSA; 
and 
(2) whether intellectual property comes within the ambit of 
that definition and, if so, how to obtain an enforceable 
"security interest" in such property. 
Personal prope11y is defined in section I of the PPSA as "chattel 
paper, documents of title, goods, instruments, intangibles, money and 
securities" (emphasis added). In order to fall within the definition of 
personal property under the PPSA, therefore, intellectual property must 
be considered "intangible" personal prope11y. "Intangible" is defined 
in section l of the PPSA as including choses in action. The definition 
makes no express reference to the inclusion of intellectual property, but 
it is not exhaustive. Although the matter has never been judicially de-
termined, a number of commentators have reached the conclusion that 
intellectual prope11y does fall within the scope of the PPSA.42 
This view is suppo11ed by American jurisprudence in the area. 
Article 9-102(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (" UCC" )41 applies 
to transactions intended to create a security interest in personal property, 
including "general intangibles". In turn, article 9-106 defines "general 
intangibles" as "any personal property (including things in action other 
than goods), accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and 
money." In the official comment that follows the section, examples of 
41 PPSA, s. 2. 
42 Sec, for example. C.S. Zimmerman. L. Bertrand and L. Dunlop, ''Intellectual Prop-
erty in Secured Transactions" ( J 99 J ), 8 C.1.P.R. 74, at 76-7. where a number of 
sources are provided as support for the proposition that intellectual property consti-
tutes intangible personal property on the basis of being considered at law as choses 
in action. In Planet Earth. supra, note I. Carter D.C.J. held that photographic 
negatives, and the copyright interests therein, were exigible under s. 19(2) of the 
Execution Act. R.S.O. 1980, c. 146 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. E.24), which refers to 
"book debts and other choses in action". 
4
·' Since the personal property security statutes in Canada arc modelled after the UCC. 
the UCC and cases decided under it are ideal reference points for assisting with the 
interpretation of questions that arise in the Canadian personal property security 
context. Sec. as well, B. Clark. The Law of Secured Transactions Under the l/CC. 
rev. ed. (Boston: Warren Gorham Lamont, 1995), which is the leading treatise in the 
United States on the UCC. 
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these include goodwill, literary rights, and rights to performances, as 
well as copyrights, patents and trade-marks. 
Given both the broad wording in the PPSA, and the favourable 
interpretation found in American jurisprudence, the better argument is 
that intellectual property comes within the ambit of the PPSA. The more 
important subject for discussion, however, is how intellectual property 
is perfected under the PPSA. 
(ii) Perfection Under the PPSA 
A. General Principles 
The PPSA has effectively standardized the taking of security inter-
ests in personal property and in so doing has lessened the need for using 
common law and equitable constmcts. The actual transfer of title is no 
longer required under the legislative scheme.44 Assuming that intellec-
tual property falls within the definition of "intangibles" in the PPSA, 
"attachment" and "perfection" are required to obtain an enforceable 
security interest in intellectual property. 
Section 19 of the PPSA makes attachment of a security interest a 
prerequisite to its perfection. Section 11 (l) of the PPSA states that unless 
attachment has occurred, a security interest will not be enforceable 
against third parties.45 A security interest attaches under section 11 (2) 
of the PPSA once three requirements are met: 
(l) the debtor has rights in the collateral; 
(2) the debtor has signed a security agreement identifying the 
collateral; and 
(3) value has been given. 
The order in which these occur is of no consequence.46 
44 In many circumstances, it should be noted that the common law and equitable 
methods continue to exist and arc used in the case of security interests in licence 
agreements and contractual rights: see. il{fra, at sec. 3(b ), "'Licences under the 
PPSA". 
4 ' Note that a non-attached security interest is nevertheless enforceable as between the 
debtor and secured party. notwithstanding its unenforceability against third parties. 
46 See, for example, First City Capital Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen Inc. (1984), 46 O.R. 
(2d) 168, 9 D.L.R. (4th) l 17, 4 P.P.S.A.C. 74 (H.C.). 
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Perfection under section 19 of the PPSA requires registration of a 
financing statement that identifies the collateral secured by the security 
agreement.47 Registration of the financing statement may be completed 
before or after the security agreement is executed:18 
B. Specific IP Concerns: After-Acquired Property 
Under section 12 of the PPSA, a security interest in intangible 
prope1ty will automatically extend to after-acquired property, as long as 
the parties to the security agreement indicate an intention to do so. This 
is typically set out in security agreements in the form of an "after-
acquired property clause". However, traditional conceptions of what 
after-acquired property is need to be stretched to fit the more esoteric 
high-technology world. For example, it is a question whether the 
following should be considered after-acquired prope1ty: 
( 1) research and development, an important component of 
high-technology companies, which results in frequent en-
hancements or new inventions, related marks and works 
under trade-mark and copyright law; or 
(2) companion technologies, whereby the inherent value of 
original computer technology becomes interconnected 
with newly developed products. 
In both of these cases, the value of security may be significantly reduced 
without such related marks or companion technology. As a result, intel-
lectual property security agreements should provide for the automatic 
collateralization of all such after-acquired property for the benefit of the 
secured creditor, because that property ensures the continued value of 
the intellectual property collateral. 
To gain automatic attachment of security interests under section 12 
of the PPSA, a debtor must have an interest in the after-acquired prop-
erty. This may present a problem in the context of intellectual property. 
Under the Patent Act, for example, new research developments must be 
•
17 Even though the PPSA recognizes three ways perfection can occur (temporary 
perfection. possession or registration), only registration applies to a lender in the 
high-technology context: s. 22 of the PPSA limits the possession method of perfec-
tion to chattel goods. instruments, secu1ities, negotiable documents of title and 
money. Likewise, s. 24 of the PPSA limits temporary perfection to security interests 
in instruments, securities or negotiable documents of title. 
·IX PPSA, s. 45(3). 
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registered separately in order to receive patent protection. The same 
applies for additions to trade-marks and copyrights under those Acts. 
To ensure successful capture of after-acquired intellectual property 
rights, they should be clearly described in the security agreement. This 
may allow any additional related intellectual property rights of the owner 
to be automatically secured under the security agreement without the 
need to enter into a new security agreement. Because of the complexities 
associated with federal Acts, however, creditors may have to seek sep-
arate security arrangements with debtors to ensure that after-acquired 
property continues to be covered under the security agreement.49 At a 
bare minimum, security agreements should include a clause providing 
the creditor with a right of first refusal on any future developments or 
registrations of intellectual property. 
(b) Licences Under the PPSA 
Where the object of a security interest is not a particular intellectual 
property asset but rather a licence or an exclusive right to use a particular 
intellectual prope1ty right, additional issues arise as to the proper appli-
cation of the PPSA. In cases where the borrower may be a licensee of 
intellectual property, the concern for lenders is obtaining security over 
the borrower's right to use that licensed property. Judicial treatment of 
this form of security under PPSA legislation is still unsettled. 
(i) licences as Personal Property? 
A revocable or retractable licence or quota issued under public 
statutory authority has been held not to constitute intangible personal 
property within the meaning of the PPSA in National Trust Co. v. 
Bouckhuyt.50 The Court of Appeal held that despite the fact that a to-
4
•i See sec. 5. "Federal-Provincial Conflict (or Peaceful Coexistence?)". inji·a. for a 
detailed discussion on this point. 
50 ( 1987), 43 D.L.R. (4th) 543. 7 P.P.S.A.C. 273 (Ont. C.A.). revg 39 D.L.R. (4th) 60, 
7 P.P.S.A.C. 113 (H.C.J.) ("Bouckhuyt"). A series of cases have considered and 
applied the reasoning in this decision. including Canadian Imperial Bank of Com-
merce v. Hallahan (1990). I P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 58, 69 D.L.R. (4th) 49 (Ont. C.A.), 
leave to appeal refused (1991), 74 D.L.R. (4th) viii. 49 B.L.R. 320 (note) (S.C.C.) 
("Hallahan"), which dealt with a milk quota under the Milk Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 
266 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. M.12). The fact that the Hallahan decision did not rec-
ognize a milk quota as intangible personal prope11y under the PPSA is particularly 
egregious since it excused what was almost certainly a fraudulent conveyance in that 
case. Bouckhuyt was also applied in a nursing home case, namely 209991 Ontario 
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bacco-production quota contained the typical indicia of proprietary in-
terests (it could be leased, transferred and pledged) and that the secured 
party had registered a financing statement against the debtor in priority 
to all other claimants, the quota, because it was subject to the absolute 
discretion of the marketing board, was a mere statutory licence or priv-
ilege and was not prope1ty within the ambit of the PPSA. This decision 
has been criticized because, by taking such a narrow view of personal 
property, it ignores modem commercial reality. It also takes an approach 
that is squarely at odds with many American decisions involving licences 
under article 9 of the UCC.5' 
Notwithstanding this criticism, Bouckhuyt remains the law in On-
tario. In Hallahan, the Court of Appeal upheld the Bouckhuyt decision 
(seemingly on a reluctant basis), but did issue an invitation to revisit the 
question of what constitutes personal property at a later date: 
It occurs to us. however. that it would be useful to have Bouckhuvt reconsidered. 
It seems to us that the court placed too much emphasis on traditional definitions 
of personal property and did not give enough consideration to the realities of 
commercial transactions within the regulatory framework of modern farm prod-
ucts marketing scheme.-'2 
Unfortunately, the court has rescinded its own invitation to reconsider 
Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (J 988), 24 C.P.C. (2cl) 248. 8 
P.P.S.A.C. 135 (Ont. S.C.) ("20999/"). In 209991. the court concluclecl that since 
the Minister of Health maintained significant discretion over the transferability of 
nursing home licences, the licence was a mere privilege ancl not a property right. 
However, clue to subsequent revisions made to the Nursing Home Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. N. 7, licensees were expressly conferred the right by virtue of subsection I (I) of 
the Nursing Home Act to create security interest in their nursing home licences, thus 
statutorily over-turning the result reached in 20999 I. The recently released decision 
in Sugannan v. Duca Community Credit Union Ltd. ( 1988 ). 38 O.R. (3d) 429 (Ont. 
Ct. (Gen Div.)), which involved a nursing home licence. has confirmed that nursing 
home licences are in the nature of property rights and can be the proper subject-
matter of a security interest under the PPSA. 
51 See, for example, the commentary of R.H. McLaren on Bouckhuvt at 7 P.P.S.A.C. 
273 at 274. See also R.M. Mercier, "Saskatoon Auction Mart: .Milk Quotas and 
Finally Some Commercial Reality" ( 1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 466 ancl Johnson, "Security 
Interests in Discretionary Licenses Under the Ontario PPSA" ( 1993), 8 B.F.L. Re~. 
123. 
52 Hallahan, supra, note 50, at 61. 
HIGH TECH LENDING 63 
Bouckhuyt, most notably in Bank of Montreal v. Bale53 and Ontario 
Dairy Cow Leasing Ltd. v. Ontario (Milk Marketing Board).54 
Nevertheless, there are a few lower-court exceptions to these de-
cisions. Re Foster'5 established that a taxi licence is personal property 
and subject to a security interest because it is not very transitory and is 
commercially marketable. This ''commercial marketability'' test has 
been applied in Saskatoon Auction Mart Ltd. v. Finesse Holsteins,56 
where the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench recognized that the 
quota's transferability and its partial granting of rights created property 
rights. In a second Bank of Montreal v. Bale case,57 the court, although 
not questioning whether a milk quota constituted intangible property 
under the PPSA per se, held that the Bank of Montreal was entitled to 
enforce its secured rights granted in the milk quota because the security 
agreement constituted an equitable assignment. 
Although statutory licences and privileges have been held not to 
fall under the PPSA, this should not be the case for "private" commer-
cial context licences, because the issues are different between arm's-
length commercial licences and statutory schemes. Moreover, in a pri-
vate licence, the contractual relations and, to a much lesser extent, public 
policy issues, govern the agreement. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
jurispmdence in Canada as to whether these private licences are pre-
cluded from being considered personal property on the basis of Bouck-
huyt. In the end, whether a private licence constitutes personal property 
or not will depend on the terms of the underlying contract between the 
parties as contained in the licensing agreement. 
5.i ( 1992), 4 P.P.S.A.C. (2cl) 114 (Ont. C.A.). affg ( 1991 ), 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2cl) 194 (Gen. 
Div.), leave to appeal refused (1993), 68 O.A.C. 239 (note) (S.C.C.). 
54 (I 993).4 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 269 (Ont. C.A.), rcvgon othergrouncls (I 990), I P.P.S.A.C. 
(2d) 149 (Gen. Div.). In this case, the court. despite concurring in the holdings of 
both Boucklmvt ancl Hallahan that a milk quota was not intangible personal property 
under the PPSA, nevertheless, it permitted the assignment of the proceeds from the 
sale of the quota. See also, R.H. McLaren, Secured Transactions in Personal Prop-
erty in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1993), at 1-9. 
55 (1992), 89 D.LR. (4th) 555, 3 P.P.S.A.C. (2cl) 6 (Ont. Bktcy.). This decision is 
difficult to rationalize and is probably wrongly decided in light of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal's decisions in Bouckhuyt and Hallahan, supra, note 50. It is nevertheless 
a useful decision in support of statutory licences qualifying as intangible property. 
56 [ 1993] I W.W.R. 265, 4 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 67 (Sask. Q.B.) ("Saskatoon Auction 
Mart"). 
57 (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 187, 7 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 121 (Gen. Div.). 
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(ii) Licences as Proceeds of Collateral? 
A problem that may become a concern for creditors and debtors 
involved in financing intellectual property is whether the granting of a 
licence itself can be considered to be a dealing of property that gives 
rise to proceeds of collateral for the purposes of the PPSA. The matter 
has received little or no judicial attention in Canada or the United States, 
but there is a smattering of American commentary on the topic.58 
Article 9-306(2) of the UCC states that a security interest continues 
in collateral notwithstanding "sale, exchange, or other disposition 
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party ... 
and ... continues in any identifiable proceeds (emphasis added). Section 
25( I) of the PPSA, in conjunction with the definition of' 'proceeds'' in 
section I, is similar in effect.59 The argument that a licence represents 
proceeds starts with an examination of what a software licence does. 
Regardless of whether a software licence is exclusive or non-exclusive, 
licences exist in order for a licensor to maintain control over copyright 
and other intellectual property rights. Since software programs can the-
oretically be copied and used an infinite number of times without dim-
inution of quality, using a program is notionally equivalent to using 
equipment or inventory. 60 Nevertheless, software programs depreciate 
in value over time as new products become available that are superior 
to the old. In this way, software licensing functions more like a lease of 
goods. 
Either way, a software developer's business depends on licensing 
arrangements rather than on sales. Because title is never transferred, a 
licensee of software merely obtains the right to use the collateral. From 
this, it follows that the software functions in a manner equivalent to 
5
' This argument is based on a discussion that arose on the ucclaw listserv ucc/aH'-l 
assocdir. wuacc.edu during the Spring of 1998. We thank Professor Benjamin Geva 
for alerting us to this debate and providing copies of the discussion. 
5
'' Section I (I) of the PPSA defines proceeds as "identifiable or traceable personal 
property in any form derived directly or indirectly from any dealing with collateral 
or the proceeds therefrom, and includes any payment representing indemnity or 
compensation for loss of or damage to the collateral or proceeds therefrom." Section 
25( I) states: "Where collateral gives rise to proceeds. the security interest therein, 
(a) continues as to the collateral, unless the secured party expressly or impliedly 
authorized the dealing with the collateral; and (b) extends to the proceeds." 
"" Sec, for example. In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). 
where coins from a video machine were held not to be proceeds. 
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leased inventory, and creditors can therefore retain an interest in the 
collateral (the licence) and the proceeds.61 It is arguable, however, that 
a software licensor is dealing with collateral for the purposes of article 
9-306(2) of the UCC (section 1 of the PPSA) and that the nature of the 
software business means that a creditor will be aware of this fact. This 
awareness can be considered de facto consent to the disposition, which 
precludes any continuing security interest in the collateral under article 
9-306(2) of the UCC (or an implied authorization under section 25( I )(a) 
of the PPSA). In effect, under this reading, the activity of licensing 
software is "dealing with collateral" for the purposes of the PPSA, and 
the imputed knowledge of creditors may therefore defeat a security 
interest. 
The lack of case law on this point in both Canada and the United 
States makes it difficult to predict whether courts will adopt this con-
struction. In any event, it is likely to have consequences only where 
bankruptcy occurs because, in the normal course of things, the proceeds 
(licence or royalty fees) will remain secured as proceeds of collateral 
under section 25( 1 )(b ). In addition, there are practical steps that creditors 
may take to further protect the possibility of this occurring. 
(iii) Practical Considerations for Secured Creditors 
Before a borrower's licence can be seen as constituting personal 
property for the purposes of the PPSA, it must be vested absolutely in 
the debtor. Discretionary authority over a licence, whether associated 
with a public authority or pursuant to the terms of a private agreement, 
detracts from the bundle of rights that are vested in the licensee. This 
does not mean that the licence needs to be exclusive. A non-exclusive 
licence can be the subject-matter of a security agreement if the licence 
is absolute, even though it may be limited in some respect by the extent 
or nature of its use or application.62 But where the interest under a licence 
agreement is defined as personal, non-exclusive, or non-transferable, or 
61 This analysis is in agreement with PEB Commentary No. 9 (UCC. article 9-306( I)), 
25 June 1992. which holds that sales of equipment disguised as leases and "true" 
leases, are both dispositions of goods of either the entire portion of the lessor's 
interest (effective sale) or partial disposition with residual interest thus allowing any 
proceeds thereof to continue as security interests. 
62 Armstrong Cork Canada Ltd. v. Domco Industries Ltd. (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 46 
(S.C.C), at 56. 
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where all proprietary rights in the subject-matter of the licence are 
reserved in the licensor, the value of any security interest granted in such 
a licence may be greatly diminished. In some cases, the licence may not 
constitute property as defined in the PPSA. Finally, where a licence is 
time-restricted, the security agreement may be nullified by the expiration 
of the underlying licence. 
Where a secured creditor is seeking to obtain an assignment of the 
debtor's rights and obligations as a licensee of intellectual property, the 
secured creditor should obtain certain covenants from the debtor. These 
covenants should ensure that all obligations under the licence agreement 
will be perfonned and that the debtor will not go into default under the 
terms of the licence agreement. In addition, it is likely that a licence 
agreement between a debtor and a licensor of intellectual property will 
require a specific consent or acknowledgment of any security assign-
ment.63 
In cases where a borrower is the licensor of intellectual property, a 
secured creditor must ensure that it obtains the right to the royalty 
payments or I icensing fees otherwise receivable by the debtor. To ensure 
co-operation with respect to assigning a debtor's rights as licensor, a 
secured creditor should arrange with the debtor for the licensee to exe-
cute an acknowledgment of the security interest being taken by the 
secured creditor. This acknowledgment should also include provisions 
that require the licensee to deliver all required licensing fees and royalty 
payments to the creditor on default by the debtor. 
(c) Temporal Limitations 
Intellectual property rights, as shown previously, primarily arise as 
a result of statute. Although these rights are initially monopolistic, many 
are limited by temporal considerations, since under the federal intellec-
tual prope1iy legislation each of the rights exists at law only for a 
specified period of time. As a result, it is extremely important for lenders 
to gain a thorough understanding of when the debtor's rights in the 
underlying intellectual property expire.64 Obviously, for the lender, a 
6
·' For a more in-depth discussion of licensing concerns see Zimmerman, Bertrand and 
Dunlop, supra, note 42, at 79-80. 
1H As noted by Zimmerman. Bertrand and Dunlop, ibid .. at 76. trade-marks, trade names 
and trade secrets are not subject to time limitations in the same way as copyrights, 
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lengthy expiration period is preferred. By way of illustration, in a case 
where the author is the first owner of the copyright, regardless of any 
agreement to the contrary, the copyright reverts to the author's estate 
(heirs or representatives) 25 years after the death of the author (unless 
the author's will provides for a contrary intention).65 If the Copyright 
Act were changed to allow reversion after five years, for example, the 
value of copyright as an asset would diminish. 
(d) Summary 
This section has reviewed some of the areas where the PPSA in-
teracts with intellectual property issues. In most cases, PPSA registration 
will be of benefit to creditors who wish to secure intellectual property 
assets. However, there are some areas where the interaction of provincial 
PPSA laws and the federal jurisdiction over intellectual property remains 
to be determined. The next section explores the various federal legisla-
tive provisions that allow collateralization of assets; section 5 examines 
the jurisdictional concerns. 
4. FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION 
(a) Introduction 
While the PPSA is available for those interested in gaining a se-
curity interest in intellectual property, it is also possible, where the 
collateral includes patents, trade-marks, industrial designs, circuit to-
pographies and copyrights (registered orunregistered), to register certain 
types of interests under the federal intellectual property legislation. How-
ever, the effect, if any, of such registration on the creation, perfection or 
priority of the security interest under a PPSA remains unclear in Canada 
because of the federal-provincial jurisdictional split, and the absence of 
clarifying language in the statutes.66 The discussion below centres on 
for example. In the case of trade-marks. a registration will remain effective for as 
long as the registrant continues to use the registered trade-mark properly and main-
tains all registrations in relation thereto. In this regard, lenders arc well advised to 
determine which trade-marks the borrower cun-cntly uses. whether that use has been 
continuous and whether all licensees have been properly recorded as registered users. 
65 Copyright Act. s. 14( I). 
M Sec Zimmerman. Bertrand and Dunlop. supra, note 42 at 87; also sec. 5, "Federal-
Provincial Conflict (or Peaceful Coexistence?)''. infra. 
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the availability of security under the specific federal intellectual propeity 
statutes. 
(b) Patents 
The Patent Act does not expressly deal with the granting of security 
interests in patent rights. Sections 49 and 50 of the Act provide for the 
"assignment" of patentable inventions, patent applications and patents 
as long as it is expressed by an instrument in writing. Notwithstanding 
that the registration of a patentable invention or patent application is 
permissive only (although such registration is strongly recommended)/'7 
an assignment of a patent must be registered in order to be enforceable 
against third parties.68 
Failing to register these various interests means a bona fide third 
patty purchaser without notice can escape the effects of any prior as-
signment. Section 51 of the Patent Act stipulates that: 
every assignment affecting a patent for invention, whether it is one referred to in 
section 49 or 50 [assignment or invention, application or patent] is void against 
any subsequent assignee, unless the assignment is registered as prescribed [in the 
Patent Act] ... before registration or the instrument under which the subsequent 
assignee claims. 
As a result, assignments not properly registered in the Canadian Intel-
lectual Property Office cannot be used against a subsequent assignee 
who has acquired the patentable invention, the patent application or the 
patent itself without notice and who subsequently registers under the 
Patent Act. As in the case of security interests generally, assignments 
for the purpose of providing security to creditors are not expressly dealt 
with in the Patent Act. These assignments should be carefully reviewed 
by the creditor to ensure that the full ambit of rights is being assigned 
over and that the debtor has the requisite rights to assign. 
(c) Copyrights 
A copyright owner may grant an assignment of a copyrighted work 
to an assignee or an interest in a copyright by assigning such rights or 
by entering into a licence agreement. Section 57 of the Copyright Act 
not only provides a mechanism for recording ownership of copyrights 
at the Copyright Office, it also permits (without expressly requiring) the 
"
7 Patent Act, s. 49(2). 
"
8 Ibid., s. 50(2). 
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registration of a "grant of interest, either by assignment or licence" in 
copyrights. The grant of a copyright interest, whether by assignment or 
licence, must be properly recorded in the Register of Copyrights at the 
Copyright Office for the grant to be protected against a subsequent 
assignee for value without notice. No link is drawn in the Copyright Act 
between this grant of interest concept and the creation of security inter-
ests. 
Section 54 of the Copyright Act provides for the establishment and 
maintenance of a copyright register and index to record particulars of 
copyrighted works. In accordance with section 54(2) of the Copyright 
Act, registration is not required in order for the author to have a protected 
work. Registering a work confers on the owner the means for proving 
subsistence and ownership of the copyrighted work and creates a re-
buttable presumption in favour of the registrant. This has the practical 
effect of placing the onus on the party challenging the validity of own-
ership or authorship to prove non-ownership.69 Furthermore, registration 
places would-be infringers on notice that the registrant has and intends 
(if it so chooses) to enforce its copyright. Registration also allows the 
registrant to benefit from statutory remedies available in infringement 
situations. 70 
Unfortunately, the Copyright Act does not define what is meant by 
the term "assignment" as used in section 57. As a result, it is unclear 
whether the term includes an assignment entered into for the sole purpose 
of providing security. On this basis, the prudent course of action is to 
register all assignments and licences under the Copyright Act, since the 
consequences associated with failing to register assignments and li-
cences of copyrights are significant. Licences or assignments not prop-
erly registered or not registered at all are void as against subsequent 
licensees or assignees for valuable consideration. 
The other aspect of copyright is an author's moral rights, which are 
inherent in a work. Moral rights include the author's right to protect the 
integrity of the work and his or her right to remain associated with the 
69 Copyright Act, s. 53(2). It appears from case law that a certificate of registration 
only constitutes a rebuttable presumption: see Circle Film Ente17>rises Inc. v. Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Co17> .. [ 1959] S.C.R. 602, 31 C.P.R. 57. 
70 The evidence that must be led to successfully rebut an issued copyright certificate 
must be credible and telling: see Alkot Industries Inc. v. Consumers Distributing 
ltd. (I 985), 6 C.l.P.R. 84, 6 C.P.R. (3d) 168 (Fed. T.D.). 
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work as its author in accordance with section 14. l of the Copyright Act. 
Although the economic rights of an author in a copyrighted work can 
be assigned, a security interest cannot be taken in the moral rights of the 
author. 71 For this reason, creditors taking a security interest in copyrights 
should obtain a moral rights waiver from the author in the event of 
default. Where a waiver has already been obtained from the author by a 
prior assignee of the copyright, the first assignee can subsequently assign 
the moral rights waiver to the creditor provided that the original waiver 
is drafted so as to include assignees. 
(d) Trade-marks 
Although the Patent Act speaks of assignments and the Copyright 
Act of both assignments and licences, the Trade-marks Act provides for 
"transfers" of trade-marks without defining the term. 72 As a result, it is 
unclear whether a ''transfer'' of a trade-mark might be used for security 
interest purposes. In addition, although the Trade-marks Branch will 
record notice of a security agreement on its register, it will not determine 
priority by the registration of a notice, unlike assignments of patents and 
copyrights. Creditors must assess whether or not a borrower's use of a 
currently registered trade-mark may be intem1pted or undermined by 
third-patty opposition or prior or parallel use by another party, which 
may bring the enforceability of the mark against third parties into ques-
tion. In addition, creditors should establish that the collateralized mark 
is an actual trade-mark and not a proposed or intended use, because 
proposed or intended use registrations are subject to opposition at any 
time by any party able to prove prior use. This could result in significant 
devaluation of the asset. 
( e) Industrial Designs 
Under section 13( 1) of the IDA, registered or unregistered designs 
are assignable, either in whole or part, by an instrument in writing. 
Registration is recorded in the Register of Industrial Designs, which is 
patt of the Office of the Commissioner of Patents. An exclusive licence 
to an industrial design may also be granted and such a licence must be 
recorded in the same manner as an assignment.73 The IDA does not deal 
71 See ss. 14.1 and 28.2( I) of the Copyright Act. 
72 Trade-marks Act. s. 47(3). 
73 IDA, ss. 13(2) and (3). 
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with the issue of priorities between assignees of registered and unregis-
tered industrial designs, but merely provides for the recording of assign-
ments and licences. As a result, lenders should make the necessary filing 
in order to protect their security over the design in question. 
(f) Integrated Circuits 
Section 7 (I) of the ICT A allows both registered and unregistered 
topographies to be transferred, ''either as to the whole interest therein 
or as to any undivided portion thereof." A topography may also be part 
of the subject-matter of a licence. 74 Neither "transfer" nor "licence" is 
defined in the ICTA. As a result, when considering taking security over 
a topography, the secured patty should make the necessary filing under 
the ICT A to protect its security interest. 
The ICTA, like the IDA, merely provides a system for recording 
assignments and licences, without dealing in any way with notice or 
priority. As a result, lenders should strictly comply with the ICT A in 
order to best protect themselves. 
(g) Form of Filings 
The form of agreement used by the lender is of fundamental im-
portance in ensuring that security can be enforced under the relevant 
federal intellectual property statute. The underlying security agreement 
should be drafted as a conditional assignment, because, as noted above, 
some of the federal intellectual property statutes explicitly provide for 
the registration of transfers or assignment of interests. 
The federal intellectual property offices accept and record security 
interests in intellectual property as a practical matter, without any ex-
press statutory authotity for doing so.75 Given that this practice is ad-
ministratively based, it provides lenders with comfort only, not with 
legal force. Unless or until the federal intellectual property statutes are 
amended to expressly deal with the granting of security interests, the 
most effective practice is to make an assignment conditional upon de-
fault. 
74 ICTA. s. 7(2). 
75 A note appeared in the Trade-Marks Journal of 8 April 1987 indicating that regis-
tration is optional. It provided as follows: "the Registrar of Trade-marks will permit 
the placement of security agreements on the files of trade-marks in the circumstances 
where such trade-marks have been put up as security." 
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5. FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFLICT (OR PEACEFUL 
CO-EXISTENCE)'? 
(a) Introduction: Constitutional Overview 
Using intellectual property as collateral depends not only on the 
value placed on the property by the lender but also on the ability of the 
lender to enforce its security interest against the debtor and third parties, 
including a trustee in bankruptcy if necessary. The current federal intel-
lectual property regimes and the provincial personal property security 
statutes create certain ambiguities that only future case law or statutory 
amendment will ultimately resolve. Some of these ambiguities are re-
viewed below. 
Most of the conflicts between the federal intellectual property leg-
islation and the PPSAs centre on the nature of the interrelationship 
existing between the federal recording scheme on the one hand (even 
though the CIPO now permits the filing of security agreements) and the 
registration of financing statements under the PPSA on the other hand. 
The situation calls for caution on the part of lenders: if they wish to 
protect their security as thoroughly as possible, they should do so by 
drawing on all possibly relevant statutory regimes. This may mean 
registering under a PPSA and under the statutes that comprise the federal 
intellectual property legislation. 
The ambiguities between the two jurisdictions arise as a result of 
the somewhat arbitrary nature of the division of powers in Canada. As 
previously discussed, the PPSA governs the taking of security interests 
in personal property and codifies the rules respecting attachment, per-
fection and priority in respect of these security interests. The provinces 
derive their authority in this area from the prope1ty and civil rights power 
under section 92( 13) of the Constitution Act, J 867. 76 On the federal side, 
Parliament has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over patents and copy-
rights,77 and has apparently exercised its jurisdiction in enacting the 
IDA, the Trade-marks Act and the ICT A under the trade and commerce 
power.78 
76 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.), also reproduced in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 ("Con-
stitution Act, 1867"). 
" Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(22) and (23) respectively. 
7
" Ibid., s. 91 (2). The Privy Council in the Canada Standard Trade-Mark Case, Refer-
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The PPSA does not contain an express provision dealing with 
conflicts between it and federal legislation. Section 8(l)(b) of the PPSA 
provides that in procedural matters in relation to the enforcement of 
rights of a secured patty, the law of the forum prevails. Section 8(2) 
suggests that the PPSA will defer to the method of perfection found in 
another jurisdiction where the law of that jurisdiction specifies a method 
for pedection of a security interest. Unfortunately, with respect to the 
federal intellectual property legislation, no method for pe1fection is 
expressly stipulated. 
Ce1tain federal statutes, including the Bank Act,79 the Canada Ship-
ping Adm and the Railway Act,81 contain express provisions dealing with 
the creation of security interests. Since each of these statutes has its own 
priority scheme in place, McLaren argues that such security interests 
will be excluded from the scope of the PPSA unless the secured party 
opts to draw on the PPSA.82 In the event that an argument over priorities 
ence re Dominion Trade & Industry Commission Act, 1935, [ 1937] A.C. 405, [ 1937] 
I W.W.R. 333, 67 C.C.C. 342, [1937] I D.L.R. 702 (P.C.), stated in obiter at 417 
that Parliament's exercise of regulatory control over and the creation of trade-marks 
was within the trade and commerce power confeJTed on Parliament. This power 
vested in Parliament was assumed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vapor Canada 
Ltd. v. MacDonald, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 and has been upheld in Asbjorn Horgard 
AIS v. Gibbs/Nortac Industries Ltd. ( 1987), 3 F.C. 44. B.C.I.P.R. 263 (C.A.). Parlia-
ment's jurisdiction over the IDA and the ICTA has not, as yet, been judicially 
commented upon: however, it is extremely likely that each statute would be found 
to be intra vires Parliament under the trade and commerce power. For a general 
overview on the category of the trade and commerce power. see P.W. Hogg. Con-
stitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Canada, 1997), at 529-
44. 
n S.C. 1991, c. 46. 
"
0 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9. McLaren, supra, note 54, at 1-53 notes an interesting case 
decided by the Federal Court, General Motors Acceptance Corp. r>f Canada v. 
Furjanic ( 1994), 79 F.T.R. 172, 7 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 52 (T.D.). where the secured party 
filed a motion in the Federal Court under the Shipping Act to prohibit the debtor 
from dealing with a ship that was subject to a conditional sales agreement. The 
secured party had registered a financing statement under the PPSA claiming a 
purchase-money security interest in the ship. The court held that the subject-matter 
of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and noted 
that the secured party's attempt to protect its interest by registering underthe PPSA 
did not bar its action in the Federal Court. 
81 R.S.C. 1985, c. R-3, s. 90 [repealed 1996, c. I 0, s. 185]. 
82 McLaren, supra, note 54. at 1-52. As he points out, in Royal Bank v. Kreiser ( 1986 ). 
6 P.P.S.A.C. 292 (Sask. Q.B.). it was held that the Saskatchewan legislature did not 
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arises between a security interest created under the PPSA and a security 
interest created under one of these specific federal statutes such as the 
Shipping Act, there are no statutory priority rules to resolve such a 
conflict, as there are under the PPSA. McLaren suggests that such con-
flicts will be resolved over time only through judicial reasoning.xi 
So what is to happen in a situation involving a conflict between a 
provincial PPSA and a federal intellectual property statute? How will a 
priority dispute between a security interest registered provincially and 
an intellectual property assignment registered federally be sorted out? 
To take a hypothetical example, what if one creditor claims priority over 
a debtor's invention because it registered a financing statement under 
the PPSA on 2 July 1997 against all of the personal property of the 
debtor, and an assignment under the Patent Act on 5 July 1997, but a 
second creditor claims under the Patent Act, having registered an as-
signment in its favour on 2 July 1997? 
A two-stage analysis is required in order to assess federal-provincial 
jurisdictional issues. The first is to assess the validity; once the validity 
is established, the second step is to check for contradictions under the 
paramountcy doctrine. The pai1y claiming priority under federal intel-
lectual prope11y legislation therefore can formulate two separate attacks: 
that the PPSA is invalid insofar as it affects federally registered securi-
ties, as Saskatchewan has done expressly in its PPSA,84 or that the PPSA 
must succumb to the paramountcy of the federal legislation. Each of 
these arguments is explored in brief below. 
have the jurisdiction to terminate a validly created security interest under the federal 
statute (section 178 [nows. 427] of the Bank Act). 
83 McLaren, supra, note 54, cites at 1-53 the following cases in support or his conclu-
sion: Rogerson lumber Co. v. Four Seasons Chalet Ltd. ( 1980), I P.P.S.A.C. 160 
(Ont. C.A.) which was applied in Bank of Nova Scotia v. International Harl'ester 
Credit Corp. (1990). I P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 93 (Ont. C.A.), revg (1987), 7 P.P.S.A.C. I 
(H.C.) and Paccar Financial Services Ltd. v. Sinco Trucking Ltd. (Trustee (!f) ( 1987), 
7 P.P.S.A.C. 176 (Sask. Q.B.). Presumably. General Motors Acceptance CoqJ. of 
Canada v. Furjanic (I 994), 7 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 52 (Fed. T.D.) can be added to this 
list for further guidance in this area. 
0
-1 Section 4( I )(c) of Saskatchewan's Personal Property Security Act (sec supra, note 
3) reads as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in this Act or the regulations. this Act does not apply to: 
(k) a security agreement govern.:d by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that deals with 
the rights of parties to the agreement or the rights of third parties affected by a 
security interest created by the agreement, including an agreement governed by 
sections 425 to 436 of the Bank Act (Canada). 
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(i) Validity 
The pith-and-substance doctrine states that one level of government 
may enact laws that incidentally affect matters within the competence 
of the other level of government.85 In our hypothetical example, three 
main approaches to assessing the validity, or proper legislative impact, 
are applicable: singling out, double aspect and presumption of consti-
tutionality with reading down. 
Provincial legislation that singles out, or that specifically targets 
areas outside valid provincial jurisdiction, can be struck down as an 
invalid exercise of provincial power; however, there are many examples 
of cases that have not followed this principle.86 Similarly, a provincial 
law that is of general application is not necessarily insulated from judicial 
review. In a number of cases, provincial legislation that affected vital 
parts of federal enterprises has been held invalid and not to apply to 
specific federal entities.87 Thus, simply relying on the general applica-
bility of the legislation is not an adequate test for determining validity. 
The double-aspect doctrine recognizes the complexity of federal-
provincial relations by providing for some overlap between the section 
91 and 92 division of powers. It simply holds that some matters may 
legitimately fall under both federal and provincial heads of government. 
In a federal system there are many instances where both levels of gov-
ernment are interested in passing laws on similar topics, even if there 
are different policy reasons for doing so. Double aspect applies when 
the relative importance of both the provincial and federal components 
is similar.88 For example, in cases involving regulation of traffic, which 
occur under both provincial highway traffic codes and the federal crim-
inal law power, 89 and in challenges made to prohibitions against stripping 
in taverns, which come under the aegis of both provincial liquor licensing 
laws and federal criminal law, both levels of government may wish to 
regulate. 9() 
x; See, for example, Ladore v. Bennett, [ 1939] A.C. 468 and Bank of Toronto v. Lambe 
(1887), 12 A.C. 575 (P.C.). 
86 See Hogg, supra, note 78. at 385-6. 
01 See Quebec (Commission du Salaire Minimum) c. Bell Telephone Co., [ 19661 S.C.R. 
767 ("Quebec Minimum Wage"), reaffirmed in Quebec (Commission de la santi et 
de la securitie du travail) v. Bell Canada, [ 1988] I S.C.R. 749. 
•• Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [ 1982] 2 S.C.R. I 61. at 18 I. 
8
" See O'Grady v. Sparling, fl960] S.C.R. 804. 
9n See Rio Hotel ltd. v. New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing Board), [I 987] 2 S.C.R. 59. 
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Since Quebec Minimum Wage and fr.,,vin Toy Ltd. c. Quebec (Pro-
cureur general),91 provincial laws that either 
( l) directly affect a vital part of the management and operation 
of a federal undertaking or 
(2) indirectly sterilize the undertaking, 
are invalid and must be read down to the extent necessary. The difficulty 
is determining the dividing line between those cases where provincial 
legislation should be read down as affecting a vital core, and those cases 
where the provincial law does not affect too greatly federal jurisdiction 
because it is, in pith and substance, a valid provincial law. Ci~v National 
Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 92 clarified this position 
further by holding that for legislation that encroaches significantly on 
the other's jurisdiction, the impugned provision must be essential to the 
legislative scheme in order to survive constitutional review; where the 
encroachment is less significant, the provision will be valid simply if it 
is functionally related to the scheme.'n For example, in General Motors, 
at issue was the civil cause of action created under the federal compe-
tition law scheme set out in section 31.1 of the Combines Investigation 
Act.94 The civil claim did impinge upon provincial jurisdiction under 
section 92( 13) propetty and civil rights - but this encroachment was 
of little significance to the Act as a whole, and on that finding was held 
to be functionally related to a scheme devoted to ensuring a national 
policy of competition. In other words, the civil remedies were simply 
an adjunct, giving teeth to the overall policy in pa1ticular, isolated in-
stances. Moreover, in all cases, courts will usually presume that any 
given law is valid, and that any possible statutory interpretations should 
be confined to the jurisdictional competence of the applicable legislature 
by reading down if necessary.95 
'" [1989] I S.C.R. 927. 
''
2 [ 1989] I S.C.R. 64 l. 
9
·' Hogg finds the test altogether too confusing and illogical: see. supra, note 78 at 415. 
Nevertheless, the arguments employed here for the PPSA pass either standard. 
94 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 [renamed by R.S.C. 1985. c. 19 (2nd Supp.), s. 19, as the 
Competition Act]. 
''
5 Sec Hogg, supra, note 78, at 396-7: sec also McNeil v. Nova Scotia (Board cd· 
Censors), [ 1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, at 687-8: Derrickson v. Derrickson, [ 1986] I S.C.R. 
285; Manitoba. v. Air Canada. [ 1980] 2 S.C.R. 303. 
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Both the federal intellectual property legislation and the respective 
provincial PPSAs are valid under their own jurisdictions and, if chal-
lenged, would not fail the first part of the test. The federal intellectual 
property statutes are clearly enacted under specific federal heads of 
power.96 Conversely, the Ontario PPSA, for example, is a law of general 
application, operating as a general secmity statute for use by individuals 
and both federal and provincial entities, and is essentially concerned 
with property and civil rights in a province. It is a single legislative 
scheme; its leading feature (its pith and substance or matter) is to ration-
alize a system for the regulation of personal property security transac-
tions, and for making it publicly registrable so as to allow creditors and 
debtors to function more knowledgeably. The most that could be said is 
that security provisions under PPSA legislation and the registration 
provisions under the federal intellectual prope1ty statutes have a double 
aspect to them. The provincial schemes are important for organizing and 
safeguarding valid provincial goals related to propetty and civil rights, 
whereas federal Parliament maintains an interest in allowing a compre-
hensive intellectual property regime, patt of which should include as-
signment rights and acknowledgment of third-party rights in property. 
The central issue here is whether the security registration system 
as found in the PPSA affects a vital or essential part of the federal 
intellectual property legislation, or conversely, whether the interests that 
may be created under the recordal schemes of the various federal intel-
lectual property statutes affect the vital core of the PPSA. The two seem 
to have completely different purposes and essential natures. The vital 
part of federal intellectual property legislation is to ensure a system of 
registration and protection of rights of property ownership in invention 
and ingenuity; each of the Acts gives incentive to human creativity in a 
market economy. PPSA legislation, on the other hand, provides a system 
of public notification for various property interests, and protects security 
rights among creditors by prioritizing claims. As compared with its 
predecessor, chattel security law, it is characterized by its "stmctural 
integration, conceptual unity, comprehensiveness, legal predictability, 
accommodation, and detailed regulation of default rights and reme-
96 See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91. This is express for patents and copyright and 
implied for trade-marks, industrial designs and integrated circuits. See supra, notes 
76 to 78 and accompanying text. 
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dies. " 97 It is a scheme of organizing and classifying that applies post 
hoc, and has little relevance to the creative spirit, or incentive to invent. 
Moreover, as the effect on federal heads of power is incidental or indirect 
because PPSA legislation regulates creditors' and debtors' rights, not 
intellectual property per se, neither is the more stringent "sterilization" 
breached.98 Therefore, rather than the provisions of either the PPSA or 
the federal intellectual property statutes being struck down on the basis 
of invalidity or improper encroachment, the more likely scenario, in 
cases of conflict, is to turn to the doctrine of paramountcy for relief. 
(ii) Paramountcy 
Federal paramountcy doctrine holds that where there are inconsis-
tent or conflicting federal and provincial laws, and both are valid, the 
federal law prevails. It is therefore a secondary test to be resorted to 
once validity is established under the characterization tests outlined 
above. Professor Hogg has described three different types of inconsis-
tency that fall under the rubric of paramountcy: express contradiction, 
negative implication and overlap.99 Each relies on slightly different 
standards of analysis. Where there is express contradiction, so that it is 
impossible to comply with both the federal and provincial law at the 
same time, the federal law prevails. 
On the other hand, a provincial law that merely supplements a 
federal Jaw without expressly contradicting it is not deemed to be in-
consistent, and the paramountcy doctrine is inapplicable. As opposed to 
the American situation, where once the federal government has legis-
lated in an area, a negative implication is drawn that precludes further 
state legislation, HX) the Canadian system allows for more co-operative 
'
17 See J.S. Ziegel. R.C.C. Cuming. Secured Transactions in Persona! Property. Sure-
tyships and Insolvency. (Vol. Ill of Commercial and Consumer Transactions: Cases, 
Text and Materials by J.S. Ziegel. B. Geva and R.C.C. Cuming) (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications. 1995). at 16. 
'" See Gibson, '·Comment", (1990). 69 Cdn. Bar Rev. 339. for criticism of the 
''relaxed" test. Also, Hogg, supra, note 78. at 405. 
'''' Ibid .. at 423-41. 
""' Referred to as the rule of pre-emption. See Hines i'. Davidowitz. 312 U.S. 52 ( 1941 ); 
Pennsylvania 1•. Nelson. 359 U.S. 497 ( 1956). Sec also. ''Note: ··occupation of the 
Field' in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-46; Ten Years of Federalism·· ( 1946), 60 
Harv. L. Rev. 262. 
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regulation between levels of government. In 0 'Grady the Supreme Comt 
found that there is no doctrine of "covering the field" in Canada, and 
that legislation from both levels of government, if not contradictory, can 
operate concurrently. It may even be that one law is stricter than the 
other; in such a case, one must comply with the stricter or face possible 
liability. 101 Finally, where the federal and provincial laws are equivalent, 
the paramountcy doctrine does not apply. 
The end result of this interplay between jurisdictions means that 
only where there is a direct contradiction, as in the hypothetical example 
given at the beginning of this section, does the doctrine apply by altering 
legislative effects. Since under the first stage of analysis - the validity 
stage - both the PPSA and the federal intellectual prope1ty statutes were 
determined to be valid exercises of legislative power, both remain intact. 
In the hypothetical, where different priorities exist between the two 
schemes because of specific facts, the provincial PPSA legislation would 
not be struck down, but simply held inoperable to the extent of such an 
inconsistency. In other words, where federal and provincial laws stipu-
late a different order of priority for paying debts, the federal interest 
must govern. 102 Only in a specific case where the facts give rise to such 
a direct contradiction would a constitutional issue arise. 
As has been advocated throughout this article, the most prudent 
course for creditors is to register security interests or assignments under 
both regimes wherever possible. Interestingly, there is much more ex-
tensive judicial (albeit inconsistent) comment on the interaction between 
federal intellectual property regimes and the UCC in the United States.'°' 
Some of this discussion may be relevant in guiding Canadian jurispru-
dence in this area; therefore, in the following analysis, American case 
law will be referred to where appropriate. 
101 See O'Grady, supra, note 89; also R. \'.Mann, [1966] S.C.R. 238; Bell v. Prince 
Edward Island (Attorney Genera[) ( 1973), [ 1975] I S.C.R. 25; Construction Mont-
calm Inc. i>. Quebec (Minimum Wage Commission). ( 1978), [ 1979] I S.C.R. 754; 
McCutcheon, supra, note 88. See also. Hogg. supra, note 78, at 430ff 
102 The situation has occurred in Canada and been resolved in favour of the federal 
priority: see Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue, [ 1928] A.C. I 87; Bozanich Re. [ 1942] 
S.C.R. 130; Ontario (Auorney General) v. Wentworth Insurance Co., [ 1969] S.C.R. 
779. 
101 See, infra, secs. 5(b) through 5( d). 
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(b) The Patent Act and the PPSA 
The interplay between the Patent Act and the PPSA is underdevel-
oped in this country. Seven decades ago, in Colpitts v. Sherwood, 104 the 
Alberta Court of Appeal held that the reference to "every assignment" 
in then section 30 of the Pateni Act (now section 51, with minor modi-
fications) included assignments intended as security and, as such, were 
registrable under the Patent Act. This remains the only case on point. 
The facts of Colpitts are straightforward: the assignee of a patent, in 
return for a loan of $2,000, granted an option to an interested third party 
to pay $5,000 for an undivided 50% interest in the patent. At the same 
time as entering into this option agreement, the assignee negotiated a 
financing arrangement with Colpitts to borrow $8,000 from him and 
provide him with an assignment of the patent as security for the repay-
ment of the loan. Subsequently, the assignee defaulted and Colpitts 
attempted to register the assignment with the patent office. It was then 
discovered that the third party optionee had exercised his option to 
acquire the 50% interest in the patent without payment of the $5,000 fee 
and had already registered the assignment under the Patent Act. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal found that all of the parties involved 
were aware of the respective agreements. Since the optionee had not 
paid the $5,000 when he exercised the option, the court concluded that 
he had committed a fraud upon Colpitts. The assignment to the optionee 
was set aside, although he was given an opportunity to acquire the 
half-interest on payment of the $5,000 to Colpitts. 
It appears that the Court of Appeal read into section 30 of the Patent 
Act the requirement that both the prior and subsequent assignee must be 
unaware of the other's assignment. This interpretation is difficult to 
sustain. How, for example, might this reasoning apply to a situation 
where the first assignee, only after registering, became aware of a sub-
sequent assignment? That from the outset the first assignee in Colpitts 
was aware of the second assignee must have been the reason that allowed 
the court to conclude as it did. In any event, the holding is at best curious, 
and at worst wrong. To rely on this decision as authority for the propo-
sition that an assignment by way of security is subject to the provisions 
of sections 50 and 51 of the Patent Act is somewhat optimistic and 
w4 Colpitts v. Sherwood, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 7. (Alta. C.A.). 
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possibly ill-conceived, especially in the light of American case law on 
this point. 105 
American courts, in interpreting language similar to that in the 
Patent Act, have held that where a security interest taken in a patent falls 
short of constituting an absolute assignment, the United States Patent 
ActHlb does not require a registration to be made under that legislation. 107 
A UCC filing will be sufficient to perfect a lender's security interest in 
a patent. In other words, the UCC will fill in the gaps where the federal 
legislation does not expressly provide for the taking of a security interest 
in a specified manner. If Congress intended to create an all-inclusive 
federal security regime for patents, it would have expressly said so in 
the legislation. 
Despite the Alberta Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Patent 
Act permits security assignments, the ambiguity in the precise meaning 
of "assignment" under the Patent Act means that Canadian lenders 
should exercise caution. Any security agreement that charges a patent, 
a family of patents, or any pending applications or licence(s) that are 
related 108 should be registered under the Patent Act (preferably in a free 
standing document) in addition to the usual registration under the PPSA. 
The underlying security agreement should be structured so as to resemble 
ws See Zimmerman, Bertrand and Dunlop, supra, note 42, at 92. 
to(> Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §261(West1984). 
107 In Waterman v. McKen-::.ie, 138 U.S. 252 ( 1891 ), the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that there were only two instances where registration under the federal 
act would be required in the case of patents - namely, in respect of licences and 
assignments. In Holt v. United States, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 336 (D.D.C. 
1973), it was noted that only assignments involving secu1ity interests would have 
to be registered under the federal statute in order to be perfected. A more recent 
case in this area, In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 633, 40 
U.C.C. Rep. (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985), involved a financing statement filed under 
the UCC. No assignment was recorded at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office ("USPTO"). Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, the trustee argued that the 
secured party's security interest in the patents was unperfected, since it had failed 
to make a filing at the federal office. The court disagreed. Notwithstanding that the 
security interest was an "assignment, grant or conveyance". the trustee was neither 
a purchaser nor a mortgagee. For a thorough analysis of the Waterman, Holt and 
Transportation Design decisions, see MacLellan, "Security Interests in Intellectual 
Property" (1992), 22 Golden Gate U. L.R. 413. 
108 Section 90 of the Patent Rules (enacted under the Patent Act) even contemplates an 
assignment of a pending application for a patent, which can obviously be of signif-
icant value to a creditor for security purposes: see SOR/96-423, s. 90. 
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an assignment conditional upon default. J(JlJ In these cases, the creditor 
would then file the agreement under the Patent Act and release any and 
all claim or entitlement to the patent(s) or patent application(s), as the 
case may be, once the debtor's obligations have been fully satisfied. 
Conservative creditors usually attempt to bring their transactions 
wholly within the filing requirements of the Patent Act (given the na-
tional scope of such registrations), while at the same time doing all that 
is required to perfect their security under the PPSA. Since the Canadian 
Intellectual Property Office accepts assignments intended as security 
(whether they are drafted as assignments, conditional upon default as-
signments, security agreements, and so on) for registration under section 
50(2) of the Patent Act, the confusion in this area of law means simply 
that caution should be exercised by duplicate registrations. 
(c) The Copyright Act and the PPSA 
As with patents, it is unclear whether the assignment provisions of 
the Copyright Act apply to security assignments. As a result, it is rec-
ommended that lenders use both the PPSA and the Copyright Act to 
perfect and protect security over copyrights. A financing statement 
should be registered under the PPSA. In order to obtain the most satis-
factory result, the security agreement should then be strnctured as an 
assignment conditional on default by the debtor, which can then be 
registered under the Copyright Act. The issue of priority, however, 
remains to be resolved. 
The Federal Court in Poolman v. Eiffel Productions S.A. 110 dealt 
with the issue of validation of a security assignment involving copyright. 
109 The security agreement ultimately used could contain such negative covenant 
clauses as: 
( l) a covenant not to fm1her encumber any of its interest in or benefit of the patent rights. 
so long as the agreement remains in force, withom the prior written consent of the 
lender; and 
(2) a covenant to agree, at the request of the lender. to execute all fmthcr matters as may 
he required by the lender related to the patent rights that are necessary to give cfkct 
to the exercise of the powers of the lender. 
This language could be further augmented by having the borrower agree in advance 
that after the occurrence of an event of default, the borrower will appoint any officer 
of the lender as attorney of the borrower. and will vest such lender appointee with 
full power of substitution to execute such matters as the borrower has agreed to give 
effect to, with the right to use the name of the borrower. 
110 ( 1991 ), 35 C.P.R. (3d) 384 (Fed. T.D.). 
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The court held that mere registration of an assignment under the Copy-
right Act did not create a right that would supersede the result dictated 
by provincial law. The holding in Poolman might suggest that Canadian 
courts, particularly in the case of security assignments, will employ the 
PPSA in deciding issues of priority among competing assignments. 
The American experience, however, is different. The leading Amer-
ican case, National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loans 
Association, 111 held that in order to perfect a security interest in a reg-
istered copyright, a registration must be made under the applicable 
federal copyright legislation 112 and not under the UCC. In that case, the 
principal assets of National Peregrine, Inc. ("NPI") consisted of a li-
brary of copyrights, distribution rights and licences to some 145 films, 
and accounts receivable arising from the licensing of these films. In 
June, 1985, Capitol Federal Savings & Loan of Denver ("Cap Fed") 
extended a $6 million line of credit to NPI, secured by its film library 
and receivables. Both the security agreement and the financing statement 
were properly filed under the UCC by Cap Fed and expressly included 
"general intangibles" in the description of the collateral. No filing was 
made at the United States Copyright Office. After NPI made a chapter 
11 1 n filing in 1989, it sought to set aside as unperfected Cap Fed's 
security interest in the copyrights and related receivables, claiming, inter 
alia, that Cap Fed was required to file its security interest with the federal 
copyright office and that failure to do so permitted NPI to retain these 
assets. Cap Fed argued the copy1ights and receivables were "general 
intangibles" recognized under article 9-106 of the UCC and that it had 
properly perfected its security interest when the financing statement was 
filed. 
The federal District Court found that the federal statute occupied 
the field with respect to copyright collateral and that the UCC filings 
against the copyrights as "general intangibles" were a nullity. As such, 
the UCC was pre-empted when it came to copyrights. 
Public policy concerns seemed to be the focus of the com1' s analysis 
in Peregrine Entertainment. These included: the need for a single lo-
111 16 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1017, 116 B.R. 194, 11 U.C.C. Rep. (2d) 1025 (Cal. Dis. Fed. Ct) 
("Peregrine Entertainment"). 
112 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 205 (Supp. lll 1991) ("U.S. Copyright Act"). 
11.1 Chapter 11 filings under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 301. 
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cation where third-pat1y searchers could go to determine whether the 
debtor's intellectual property had been encumbered; the specific and 
separate scheme for determining priority among conflicting transferees 
established by the Copyright Act; and the express provision of at1icle 
9-302(3)(a) of the UCC, which provided that filings were not necessary 
to perfect a security interest where a system of national or international 
registration was in place. 
Peregrine Entertainment has not clarified this area of law, however, 
as commentators disagree on the appropriate way to take security inter-
ests in copyrights. Some would support the theory that there has been 
complete pre-emption by the federal legislation over copyrights, while 
others support the opposite theory. 114 A more pragmatic view would be 
to characterize the federal law as governing priority of copyright own-
ership in respect of assignments among assignees and the UCC as gov-
erning the registration and priority of other security interests. 
This interpretation makes sense for Canada, especially since reg-
istration under the Copyright Act of a copyright or an interest therein is 
not compulsory, and since there is no constitutional doctrine of pre-
emption in Canada as there is in the United States. In order to preserve 
a secured party's security interest in and over a copyright, then, it is 
arguable that there is still room for a PPSA registration. On this basis, 
creditors taking security over copyrights should use the Copyright Act 
in order to protect their positions, while not forgetting to register under 
the PPSA. Only in the case of an express contradiction will the federal 
legislation render the provincial PPSA inoperable. 
(d) The Trade-marks Act and the PPSA 
The Trade-marks Act provides for the non-compulsory registration 
of a trade-mark pursuant to section 48. The registration of trade-mark 
assignments is also provided for in the same section. Since the Trade-
marks Act refers to assignments and not to security interests in general, 
114 See J. Lam, "Banking on a Dream: Perfecting Security Interests in Copyrights'' 
( 1993), 13 Loyola of L.A. Ent. L.J. 319, at 333. See, as well, the recent decision 
reached in Re Avalon Sofiware, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997), where 
the court held that the proceeds of sale derived from copyrightable materials and a 
security interest in such materials will be unperfectcd if filed or recorded anywhere 
other than at the United States Copyright Office. 
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it is arguable that only a security assignment that actually passes own-
ership of the trade-mark to the creditor needs to be registered under the 
federal statute. 
As with patents and copyrights, one method for taking a security 
interest in a trade-mark is to take an assignment that is conditional upon 
default and register it under the federal legislation. The debtor in such 
cases will be obligated to assign the trade-mark to the secured pat1y in 
the event of default. This approach should not pre-empt the registration 
of a financing statement in respect of the same trade-mark under the 
PPSA. 
Judicial opinion in the United States is mixed on whether the reg-
istration of a security interest in trade-marks is pre-empted by registra-
tion under the applicable federal statute. Under the Peregrine Entertain-
ment line of reasoning, one would expect there to be no room for a 
PPSA-like security registration under any federal regime that provides 
for the registration of assignments. However, at least two American 
cases dealing specifically with trade-marks have shown a clear willing-
ness to recognize the non-exclusive nature of the federal Lanham Act' 15 
governing trade-marks in the United States. 
In Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 116 the Sixth Circuit 
held that the wording of the federal statute was not sufficient to protect 
registrants who file security interests only at the federal level. Such 
exclusivity, the court maintained, would have to be expressed clearly in 
the legislation before it could make a determination of preemption. 
In Re TR-3 Industries, 117 the issue was whether a bank had perfected 
a security interest in the trade-mark "TR-3" as part of a floating lien 
covering "all general intangibles" of the debtor. The bank filed a fi-
nancing statement under the UCC but made no security assignment filing 
in the USPTO. The unsecured creditors' committee in the chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings of the debtor argued that the Lanham Act re-
quired the security assignment of the trade-mark to be filed in the 
USPTO. The court found otherwise. It concluded that the Lanham Act 
contained no statutory provision for the registration of any instrument 
115 Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § I 060. 
11
" 43 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). affd 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986). 
117 41 B.R. 128, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 279 (Bankr. CD Cal. 1984). 
86 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [ 14 B.F.L.R.] 
or document assetting a security interest in a trade-mark. If Congress 
had intended there to be such exclusive powers, it would have provided 
for such a method of perfecting security interests in trade-marks or 
provided a method of giving constructive notice of such interests. There-
fore, the transaction was not excluded from article 9 of the UCC, with 
the result that the bank's filed financing statement was allowed to gov-
ern. 
Again, because there is no constitutional doctrine of pre-emption 
in Canada, the PPSA will likely cover a secured party's interest over 
trade-marks absent an express contradiction. Given the lack of a proper 
registration and priority scheme under the Trade-marks Act, it is of even 
greater importance for creditors to ensure that a PPSA registration and 
requisite acknowledgment are obtained. 
(e) Summary 118 
The wording found in much of the Canadian federal intellectual 
property legislation regarding security of assets is strikingly similar to 
that in the United States. In each of the Patent Act, the Copyright Act 
and the Trade-marks Act, the language creates an uneasy relationship 
with the PPSA. American legislation and case law in this area reveal the 
existence of similar tensions, despite the existence in the United States 
of a "covering the field" doctrine that seems to heavily favour federal 
initiatives. As a result, Canadian lenders faced with taking security over 
intellectual property assets should, especially where such assets make 
up a significant proportion of the borrower's asset base, do all that is 
necessary to comply with both the PPSA and the relevant federal re-
gimes. 
6. CONCLUSION 
It is a hallmark of the cautious conservatism of the legal profession that the 
dilemma of choice was usually resolved by registering under both Acts. It recalled 
"" With regard to both the ICTA and the IDA. many (if not all) of the same issues 
raised previously in this section exist vis-a-vis the PPSA, so will not be discussed 
further. In any case, there arc no reported decisions relating to these statutes and the 
PPSA, and the practical advice given for the other intellectual property regimes 
would be similar. 
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to me the sage advice of one of my law professors who counselled wearing 
suspenders as well as a belt so as not to get caught with your pants down. 11 " 
This article has not resolved all issues inherent in securing intellec-
tual propetty assets. Given Canada's federal structure, that goal may not 
be possible, because, as Zimmerman, Bertrand and Dunlop state, "the 
current legislative schemes in Canada do not easily facilitate the taking 
of security in intellectual property.'' 120 Although the PPSA provides for 
the creation and perfection of security interests in intellectual property, 
the federal intellectual prope1ty legislation does not expressly address 
this issue at all. This jurisdictional incongruity creates a situation where 
lenders and their counsel are left struggling to find a level of comfort 
under both legislative schemes. As a result, many issues remain unre-
solved and will only be effectively dealt with by future legislative 
amendment or judicial comment. 
One possible solution to this jurisdictional quagmire may be to 
create a single federal register that deals solely with intellectual prop-
erty. 121 In order for this system to work, however, statutory reform that 
sorts out the priorities between competing interests would be required. 
In the meantime, current structures do protect lenders who advance 
moneys in the intellectual property environment, as long as they employ 
an extra dose of caution. Initial prudence is required to be aware of those 
considerations that do not typically arise in more traditional types of 
secured financing transactions. More important, where many legal issues 
remain unresolved, it is imperative that lenders ensure that they ulti-
mately obtain exigible and saleable bundles of rights, including not only 
the intellectual property but also the tangible products that are derived 
from and are embodied within such rights. 
11
'' F.M. Catzman, "Secured Obligations in Ontario: Perfecting the Law" in Rights 
and Remedies in the Law l!f Creditor and Debtor, Special Lectures of the Law 
Society of Upper Canada (Don Mills, Ontario: De Boo, 1988), 285, at 286. 
120 Zimmerman, Bertrand and Dunlop, supra, note 42, at 122. 
121 Jn fact, the National Intellectual Property Section of the Canadian Bar Association 
created an ad hoc committee on security interests in intellectual property. which 
proposed a federal intellectual property security act modelled after the PPSA. Un-
fortunately, the proposal soon died and the committee is currently inactive. It is 
hoped that legislation of this nature will ultimately be adopted, although passage is 
obviously now some time away. 
